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In future chron61ogies of Soviet history the year 1979 deserves a modest place as a watershed of sorts, the year in which the Soviet economy began its present period of low growth and associated difficulties, now in its seventh year.
There is little need to expand here on the well-known economic facts. In a few words:
the six years, 1979 through 1984, have been characterized by (histaricaiiy) low growth, over-all and in a number of sectors, which pr.=ises to persist until at least the end of the decade; by relatively lower ra--izs of capital formation; by six bad or mediocre grain crops in a row, causing unprecedentedly large imports of food and fodder; by levelling-off of energy production; and by growing difficulties in earning hard currency. These and other "real" developments have received ample attention in the West. Also noted in the West has been the plight of the Soviet consumer: unusually widespread shortages of goods, especially food; longer queues; informal and local formal The standard explanations for empty shelves and high free-market prices offered in the Western press and by unofficial as well as official Soviet sources point to shortfalls in supply.
The Soviet press has been conveniently playing up criminal diversion of supplies into the black market by "greedy" trade personnel, which may well have been the case under the circumstance,, but is hardly the root cause of the shortages. On the other hand, official Soviet production and foreign-trade data provide no strong support for the popular impression of a serious decline in the availability of foodstuffs--not to say all consumer goods--in the recent period, though official data do show modest declines in 2 per capita consumption of specific foods in certain recent years. Of course, one must not take Soviet statistics at face value, particularly in a period such as the one under review. But could there be other factors at work to help bring about the observed phenomena?
Belaboring the obvious, let us remind ourselves, first, that physical shortages and their concomitant phenomena cannot arise and persist unless prices are fixed, which is indeed the Soviet case, and second, that a rise in effective demand, with prices fixed and supply unchanged (or, more generally, a change in the supply-demand balance in the appropriate direction), will also bring about empty store shelves, etc. But the ordinary consumer and the casual observer, faced with empty shelves and rising free-market prices, naturally, blames the shortage on shortage, i.e., on insufficiency of supply or production and not on an excess of money in the pockets of his/her fellow shoppers nor on unduly low (official) prices.
In this paper we argue (1) that, since 1979, the Soviet Union has experienced not only low growth rates of a number of real indicators but also an acceleration in the rise in the money supply, and particularly in currency in circu-lation; (2) that this monetary development is at least in part a systemic consequence of the unanticipated slowdown in real growth; (3) that it has further worsened the economy's performance in real terms; (4) that certain important social and political consequences have stemmed therefrom, including a significant redistribution of private income and wealth; and (5) that these developments have aggravated the task of managing the economy and ruling the country, and have seriously complicated the prospect of a meaningful economic reform. Needless to say, to focus on the monetary ncxus of social and political consequences of low growth is not to deny or ignore the other ways in which low growth may translate into socio-political problems, some of which indeed are discussed in other contributions to this volume.
The Mechanics of Currency Issue
First, a few elementary observations about money in the USSR (and other Soviet-type economies) as they relate to our thesis. Currency is almost the only means of payment by households for purchases of goods and services in official outlets and among themselves. State firms and institutions are permitted to use currency only for very small payments--other than for wages--and to hold only minimally necessary amounts on hand. (However, anecdotal evidence suggest that they may hold substantial concealed amounts for illegal purposes.) An important exception are the collective farms, which seem to possess considerably greater latitude to use and hold currency. Yet another important exception, of course, is the underground economy, which--as in other countries--relies almost exclusively on currency, for obvious reasons. The other major means of payment in the USSR is bank money, which is used solely within the socialist sector and consists of the clearing deposits of enterprises (raschetnye scheta, "settlement accounts"), other enterprise deposits, and the current ac-counts (tekushchie scheta) of kolkhozes and so-called social organizations.
Soviet bank money functions somewhat like the checking or gyro accounts in the West, but its payment circuit is deliberately separated and to considerable extent insulated from the currency circuit.
As already noted, there is almost universal price control, for both producer and consumer goods. In the household sphere the only lawful exceptions to price 3 control are (1) most everyday transactions between individuals,
and (2) transactions in the kolkhoz market, but even here sporadic though mostly unsuccessful attempts at price control take place. The kolkhoz market deals mostly in foodstuffs, produced mostly by peasants and state-farm workers on their private account. Finally, there is a large black market, where, by definition, prices are free.
Any increase in the stock of currency in circulation must be created. In the USSR, as elsewhere, money is created by the banking system in the process of net lending. Since Soviet banks lend almost exclusively to the socialist sector rather than to households, nearly all newly-created money initially has the form of bank money (supra). However, the bulk of the firms' payments is ultimately for labor, which must be in currency; hence, most newly-created bank money is soon converted into currency and enters the household sector. In sum, an increase in bank-loans outstanding is soon largely transformed Into an increase in currency in the public's hands, unless offset in some manner (e.g., by an increase in the budget's cash receipts).
What, then, determines the aggregate volume of net bank lending to enterprises in a given period? According to Soviet textbooks, it is the "credit plan", part of a comprehensive national financial plan for the period, which in turn is 4 supposedly drawn up in coordination with the national economic plan. The credit plan is disaggregated to set the limits of lending to each bank branch, and, hence, for the set of firms attached to a given bank branch. Yet, more careful reading of the relevant Soviet literature and interviews with knowledgeable persons in the emigration lead to a somewhat different conclusion; namely, that the bank will typically lend to a firm to the extent of its needs to pay wages, settle with suppliers, and, in general, to stay solvent so as to keep operating.4 In sum, the banking system lends to ensure that production is not interrupted and workers retain their jobs, credit plan or no.
In this sense it acts as an active custodian of some of the most important values of the Soviet order--primacy of politico-administrative power over money, unhampered production growth, full employment, and the individual's job security--though at the risk of excessive credit--and money--expansion. At the same time, thanks to the bank's accommodating stance, the state firm faces a "soft budget constraint" (Kornai). For this, it does not need--nor is in fact allowed--to hold large money balances, as either currency or bank money; the bank's lending
window is generally open to it for any lawful (or pseudo-lawful) need.
Finally, a budget surplus (deficit)--in a cash sense--increases (decreases) the treasury's deposits with the banking system, and should to a comparable though probably smaller amount reduce (increase) currency in circulation.
A Hypothesis: The Effect of Supply Shocks on Bank Lending
In the event of significant and unanticipated supply shocks, the just-described financial and monetary arrangements may virtually automatically turn into a mechanism for additional and presumably undesired money creation. In a pricecontrolled, resource-constrained economy, such as the Soviet, supply shocks tend to translate themselves into specific shortages and production bottlenecks. Production slows down in a number of industries and firms. For example, the major shock to the Soviet eccnomy from the malfunctioning of the railways in 1979 had almost immediate negative effects on production in such industries as heavy chemicals, forest products, construction materials, and iron and steel, with further repercussions on the whole economy. Moreover, under Soviet conditions, setbacks to the production of finished goods cause neither a decline of over-all labor employment (job guarantee), nor of the acquisition by firms of material inputs other than those in diminished supply at the given moment.
Instead, the shortages cause imbalances in inventory composition on the microlevel as between different materials, as between material supplies and finished goods, and as between labor employment and rate of production. Indeed, the inventories of materials which, at the moment and place, do not limit production may well accumulate enough to compensate for the decline of those of "deficit" materials, especially since hoarding of all materials now becomes more attractive to the firm. Yet, as noted, the bank virtually automatically furnishes currency to pay labor and bank-money to pay for those supplies that keep arriving, extending additional credit where necessary. And the additional credit may indeed be necessary should a firm's sales decline owing to supply shortages.
We hypothesize, therefore, that unanticipated supply shocks under Soviet conditions tend to increase the amount of bank loans outstanding.
("Unanticipated", because anticipated supply shocks can presumably (?) elicit timely corrective action to forestall, or at least restrain, the surge in bank credit by redirecting supplies to minimize bottlenecks and scaling down production targets.) Moreover, as already mentioned, the structure of bank loans by purpose would tend to change: the proportion of loans extended to finance the holding of inventories of materials and goods-in-process, and for general liquidity purposes, would tend to rise; that of finished goods (at each stage of production) would tend to diminish.
We have so far spoken of supply shocks. But shocks can also come from sudden changes in the leaders' priorities. A war in Afghanistan, an emergency operation to support the Polish economy, a response to American re-armament--such demand shocks may also generate additional bank credit, not only to the positively affected industries but also to those whose supplies are interrupted by the shift in priorities and, of course, to the treasury.
Credit Expansion, 1979 Expansion, -1983 We now turn to the statistical evidencd. Table I summarizes the evolution of loan balances in the domestic economy (excluding any loans to the treasury) and of goods inventories at enterprises against the background of real GNP growth (CIA series). All data are in current prices.
5
From 1966-70 through 1979 the pattern is clear: almost steady decline in growth rates of all four series (lines 2., 4., and 5.), though in any period the rate of growth is invariably highest for loans, second for inventories, and lowest for GNP. However, the difference ("excess") between the rates of growth for loans, particularly short-term loans, on one hand, and of the real rate of growth of GNP or inventories, on the other (lines 8a. and 8b.), steadily widens, bearing-a hint of excessive currency issue (in relation to the first economy)
in the years [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] . That this should have been the case need not intuitively surprise anyone familiar with the Soviet economy, but we owe it to Igor
Birman to have attempted numerical estimates of currency issue in those years, For all other years, increase for the year.
c. These figures for 1966-70 were computed omitting Vneshtorgbank loans, which were less than five percent of all loans in that period.
d. Inventories (zapasy tovarno-material'nykh tsennostei) held by business firms, except kolkhozes.
e. Owing to the resetting of nearly all wholesale prices as of January 1982, the comparability of this figure with those for earlier years is questionable.
f. The figures in parentheses are rates of growth of loans taking into account the 6.0 BR of loans forgiven to kolkhozy in 1982; see note g., Table 3 .
n.a. = not available p..Figures in this column may be preliminary.
using a method different from ours, and to Wiles for carefully proofing them (Birman 1980 (Birman , 1981 Wiles 1983 ).
In 1979 Table 1) .
Later on, as we analyze in some detail the components of this, as it were, explosion of short-term loans outstanding, we shall relate it to two major factors: the unbalanced-inventories effect, as hypothesized, and a seemingly independent steep rise in short-term loans to the contract construction industry.
In 1982 and 1983 (the latest year for which bank statistics are available at this writing) the loan picture shows another sharp turn-around. In 1982, the Increase in short-term loans suddenly drops to 8.1 (or 9.7; see line 4. of Table 1 ) percent, i.e., well to its average historical level before 1980. An in !983
it drops even further--to 6.2 percent. But because GNP growth, while clearly improving in 1982 and 1983, is still historically low, the "excess" rate of growth of short-term loans is still historically high in 1982--but notably low A closer look at the structure of bank loans during the crucial years 1980 and 1981 can be had in The reform measure of July 1979 provided for a greater role for banks in financing fixed-capital investment; this did not happen, apparently.) Table 2 presents, for each type of loan, the average annual rate of increase during the three years just before 1979 (i.e., 1975-1978) , the ruble amount of loans outstanding at the end of 1979, the same at the end of 1981, and the average annual rate of increase over the two years following 1979, i.e.,
1980-1981.
In addition, the same information is shown for construction (line 5.)7, and for all activities (sectors) other than construction (line 6.).
The reason for singling out construction in the table is that it attracted a highly disproportionate amount of short-term credit from 1975 through 1981.
At the end of 1975, construction accounted for less than 8 percent of all short-term loans to the economy; by the end of 1981, the figure had risen to nearly 26 percent. After 1981, loans for construction increased only at approximately the same moderate rate as loans to the whole economy, as already noted. By channeling so much bank credit into construction during [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] the authorities aimed to reduce sharply the role of customers' advances in financing the notorious "unfinished construction" and "uninstalled equipment" and thereby to bring these wasteful phenomena un'er better control.
8 Table 2 USSR: Short-term Bank Loansa by Purpose, 1975 Purpose, -1981 Purpose, (amounts at year-end) 1975 Purpose, -1978 Purpose, 1979 Purpose, 1981 Purpose, 1980 Purpose, -1981 increase in total short-term loans to the economy over the two-year period.
We can find no evidence that this extraordinary outpouring of credit was substantially offset by net revenue in the (admittedly murky) budget accounts.
But construction alone does not explain the great credit expansion of 1980-1981; loans for all other sectors taken together (line 6.) also turned up considerably The next three lines of the table may be of some interest in relation to our hypothesis of credit-inflation during a slowdown. Line 7. combines two types of loan--to finance unfinished output (goods in process) and uninstalled equipment--that would tend to turn up, as we supposed, thanks to bottleneck formation during the slowdown. But these are also types of loan that are in large measure destined for construction and, hence, may be unduly inflated by the special case of that industry. Line 7. does indeed shoot up--from 23.8 percent per year before 1979 to 88.2 percent after 1979--but the heavy influence of construction clouds its meaning for our hypothesis.
Line 8. is the sum of loans to finance production materials and "for other purposes". (The latter is apparently a composite of various types of loan es-14 sentially aimed to maintain a firm's solvency.)
Thus, the category on line 8.
is also of the kind that may be expected to grow relatively fast in response to an unexpected slow4down. On the other hand, the composite loan category on line 9. finances finished goods of various kinds (including those in transit to customers) we expect it to grow relatively less rapidly under the same conditions, and it does. Indeed, as a comparison of lines 8. and 9. indicates, the two categories do behave in a manner not inconsistent with our hypothesis.
The average annual rate of growth of line 8. more than doubles between 1975-1978 and 1980-1981 ; that of line 9. increases only by 36 percent of itself, i.e., only one-third as fast.
Effects of Credit Expansion on Currency Issue
The Soviets have not published an absolute figure for currency in circulation for nearly half a century, or any relative figure that would permit direct extrapolation beyond January 1, 1958. Igor Birman has estimated currency circulation (actually, household currency holdings) by reconstructing the cash flow between the household and the socialist sectors; his figure for 1979 is 54 BR. 1 0 The interested reader is referred to the Appendix to this paper for a discussion of different methods of estimation.
In an earlier paper (Grossman, 1983) we used the method of partial reconstruction of the consolidated balance sheet of the banking system to obtain changes in net liability residuals which might serve as indications of annual increments in currency circulation--or, more correctly, indications of annual changes in the increments. That paper carried the figures only through 1980
(with a postscript for 1981), but it did already bring out vividly the beginning of what was apparently to be a remarkable surge in currency issue.
In the present paper we return to the method, carry the estimates to 1983, and introduce several modifications (see Table 3 ). First, we now complete the coverage of the Soviet banking system by rectifying the omission of the Bank for Foreign Trade (Vneshtorgbank) 11, whose loans, which we assume to be short-term exclusively, add 10 to 13 percent to the total of short-term loans by the other two domestic lending banks, Gosbank and Stroibank, during 1975-1983 . Second, for lack of recent data we now omit several minor categories of liabilities,12 an omission and simplification that hardly affects the larger picture at all.
In cases of ambiguity we try to deliberately err on the "conservative" side,
i.e., on the side of understating the suspected increase in currency circulation. Thus, we omit from consideration increases in long-term loans to enterprises on the "conservative" supposition that they are offset by corresponding budgetary appropriations to the banks. 13 We assume that the nominal budget surplus is a true cash surplus which increases the treasury's balance with Gosbank, despite strong specialist opinion to the contrary.14 We overlook the high likelihood--especially in hard times such as those under review--of significant net bank loans to the treasury (which Soviet practice presumably includes and conceals in the budget receipts total); in any case, we have no data for such loans.
(Bank loans to the treasury would, of course, be money-creating, like any bank loans.) To the extent that these assumptions are false, currency issue estimates are understated by the method of balancesheet residuals.
(However, the omission of the changes in the smaller types of bank liability mentioned in the footnote to the preceding paragraph works in the opposite direction, though slightly.) Finally, we omit fluctuations in bank holdings of monetary gold and foreign exchange, and in external indebtedness--none of which is likely to be a serious exception to our "conservative" approach to currency estimation. 1971-1976-1980-1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1983 4. Bank loans, short-term 13. 1978 :8, 1974 :9, 1976 :10, 1977 :10, 1978 :9, 1979 :11, 1980 Den'gi i kredit, 1972 Den'gi i kredit, :12, 1973 :8; Press Bulletin, Moscow Narodny Bank (London), 7- 15-1980, 8-18-82, 6-20-84. c. We are unable to find Vneshtorgbank balance-sheet data for the end of 1982
(or 1-1-1983). The figure given here is the mean of "total assets" for 1-1-1982 and 1-1-1984, multiplied by 0.84, the ratio of "loans, etc." to "total assets" that obtained fairly steadily for several years previous.
The same factor is applied to "total assets" on 1-1-1984 to obtain "loans, Or, letting A stand for "annual increment of", we write ASTL -(AMM + ASO + BS) = R; see line 9. of Table 3 . "R" can be thought of as unexplained change in net liabilities of the banking system. Its absolute value in itself has little meaning because our reconstruction of the banks' consolidated balance sheet is partial; and it certainly should not be identified with currency issue. But, on the assumption that the increments of omitted assets and liabilities are either largely mutually offsetting or relatively small, we may associate major annual changes in R as being indicative of major changes in the same direction of such a major unpublished item on the liability side as currency in circulation, i.e., the annual currency issue.
The behavior of R in our table is rather striking. Unfortunately, Soviet secretiveness in regard to currency circulation precludes a more definitive conclusion. Perhaps some day we shall know more, and will 21 be able to either confirm our lucubrations or utterly refute t iem. 1978-- 14.4 BR, 1979 --15.1 BR, 1980 --10.3 BR, 1981 --9.2 BR, 1982 BR. What greases the wheels of the system greases private palm. Pushers, fixers, brokers, and middlemen of all sorts proliferate. More tasks are farmed out by socialist firms to private individuals and groups; cf. shabashniki in construction, gektarshchiki in agriculture, "non-staff" workers everywhere.
Much of this activity is plan-benign (to use Wiles's phrase): it serves to further official objectives and plans, albeit by illegal means. It also tends to shift a fair amount of the burden of coordination and balancing under conditions of growing economic complexity from the planners to the impersonal ad-24 justment mechanism of the socialist underground.
It points to a spontaneous decentralizing, marketizing reform of sorts.
But the system of rule suffers from illicit diversion of energies and resources, distortion of official information, slippage of effective governance of the economy, decline in the respect for the plan, the law, and the whole official system, a general spread of cynicism and self-servingness, and, not the least, from an uncontrollable redistribution of private income and wealth and the consequent effects on regime corruption.
The Private Underground and Redistribution of Income and Wealth. In the household sector, the currency inflation translates into a combination of shortages in official outlets and price increases in the free markets, stimulates illegal private activity and augments private income therefrom. And since little underground economic activity takes place in the Soviet Union without paying off some authorities, we can safely assume an upturn in bribes and graft as well. The net result is a substantial redistribution of private income and wealth especially from illegal sources, and not just between individuals but also between social groups, regions, and ethnic groups.
Who has gained from the recent economic slowdown and the attendant inflation?
Obviously, all those who have physical or administrative power of disposal over material values and can realize the potential gain, those who (in part for the same reason) are in a position to produce goods and services on their own account, and those authorities, large and small, who are able to extract graft and tribute from the first two groups. Among the gainers may well be many peasants, thanks to the rise in open-market food prices. These--as it were--are "Brezhnev's new rich", a heterogeneous class, to be sure.
Who has lost? Those who lose in any inflation anywhere: students, pensioners, fixed-wage and fixed-salary recipients, provided they have no opportunities for illicit gain and/or privileged access to "closed distributors" of consumer goods. However, ability to benefit from the second economy or from bribes is not sufficient; one must benefit enough to offset the rising cost and difficulty of living.
The resultant redistribution of income--and the even greater redistribution of private wealth--has been a major theme in the Soviet press for the last few years (albeit often obliquely presented), in the emigre press, and in the reports of recent arrivals from and visitors to the USSR. All sources seems to agree that grasping, hustling, wheeling-and-dealing have been gaining ground in everyday life.
Policy Problems. Andropov took over from Brezhnev not only a country in the midst of economic stagnation and major social change, but also one in which public opinion, including elite opinion, was in the danger of becoming seriously polarized on issues of socio-economic policy, morality, equity, and ideology.
His earliest measures--employing repressive means against indiscipline, lack of order, and corruption--aimed to stem the processes of social dissipation below and loss of control above. Of course, such extreme measures could at best be temporary. Andropov did not live to attempt lasting solutions, if indeed such were within his power to carry out.
Under Chernenko--at this writing Gorbachev has barely succeeded to the supreme position--the country returned to "normalcy", but not a static normalcy. Left alone, society will slowly encroach upon vlast' (political power) and poriadok (order).
The second economy will continue to take advantage of the inflation, open and repressed, will steadily push against the limits of the possible, and will grow. Corruption will not stay within its bounds. The monetary overhang does not have to keep expanding in order to continue to corrode the formal economic mechanism, further demoralize the public, and undermine the legitimacy of the official order. The wealth of the "new rich" will breed on itself, as wealth always does. Social tensions will persist, perhaps intensify. Will the regime find within itself the consensus and the courage to perform the major surgical operation of confiscating a large part of the liquid assets in private hands by means of a drastic currency conversion possibly with a partial confiscation of savings deposits, as in 1947?
That it may not is suggested by Jaruzelski's failure to do the same in Poland in the first months after his coup in December 1981, when the need was even greater and the moment certainly more propitious than for Gorbachev today. In good part the new, illicit wealth is concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite and its clients; and moreover, the inter-regional, inter-national, inter-ethnic inequities of any such expropriation will be large and politically serious.
But without such a surgical operation, the chances that effective systemic reform will be attempted, let alone carried out, would seem to be low, though even this necessary step is, of course, far from sufficient. Take, for instance, a modest expansion of the legally permitted scope of private activity; a rather sensible measure on its own merits, if only because it would legalize some of the already existing underground activity. Yet in view of the excess purchasing power, it would look like legalizing wild self-enrichment, inviting more corruption, and upsetting orderly labor markets and stable wage levels. Or take a reform entailing some degree of marketization of the socialist sector. Managerial autonomy under conditions of strong inflationary pressure may be seen as a license for diverting resources from officially desired ends, putting greater strain on price and wage controls (or, alternatively, fueling g inflation), and leading to even more misappropriation of state property, statistical legerdemain, self-enrichment, and corruption.
The economic slowdown would seem to call for radical systemic solutions, but--if this paper is not in serious error--the recent currency inflation, the slowdown's near-automatic consequence, may be placing an additional obstacle to such a reform and its successful realization.
POSTSCRIPT: Shortly after the present paper was completed, there appeared a brief article by V. Alkhimov, Chairman of the Board of USSR Gosbank, which sheds additional light on some of our arguments.
("Bankovskii kredit i raschety" [Bank Credit and Payments], Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, 1985:21, p. 13.) Alkhimov cites 1-1-1985 figures for aggregate Gosbank loans outstanding --384 BR for all loans, 316 BR for short-term loans [indicating 1984 increases of 20 BR and 17 BR, respectively, approximately equal to those of each of the preceding two years]. He proceeds to imply that these increases are excessive, and to blame, in the first instance, the unwarranted accumulation of goods inventories by enterprises. The growth in loans outstanding during the year took place despite dishoarding by enterprises of 2 BR worth of inventories under Gosbank pressure, and a 30 BR cutback by the Bank of loan requests by ministries and other departments.
Next, Alkhimov turns to "payment credit", advances to buyers to pay sellers' invoices, a practice identified in this paper as a significant cause of inflation. His remarks are worth quoting verbatim: "As is known, payment credit may be granted only in the event of temporary insufficiency of funds on the buyer's part. And yet, many enterprises avail themselves of it over considerable periods of time as a way of filling gaps in their financial condition... Our proposals to restrict the use of payment credit to reasonable time periods have run into resistance by certain business executives and scholars, who contend that such loans need not have a limited term. From this latter standpoint, the Bank in effect becomes the universal buyer and paymaster [vseobshchii pokupatel'-platel'shchik] .
This kind of approach is entirely inconsistent with any principles of businesslike management [khozraschet] Adding to this an assumed (small) amount in circulation at the beginning of the period and adjusting downward, to be on the conservative side ("quite arbitrary", "more on intuition than on precise knowledge"), he arrives at an esti- notes in circulation in this way; rather, both used method (1), as already mentioned. The reason is that their reconstructed annual balance sheets, though quite detailed, still yield a difference between the debit and credit sides of the ledger that cannot be easily identified with the item "notes outstanding".
(4) A variant of the preceding method--which we may call the method of balance-sheet increments--is the reconstruction of annual changes in those items of the Bank's balance sheet for which such data are available or estimatable, hoping that the unexplained residual change (credit or debit) will approximate the change in the value of notes in circulation. The underlying premise is that certain balance-sheet items for which no current data are available may also change relatively little from year to year (e.g., the capital account), while other unknown items may be too small to matter. Naturally, this method cannot yield an estimate in the amount of notes outstanding at any given date, but at best only an approximation of the change in this amount. But this may still be an important statistic, especially if in any year the value of the change deviates drastically from a known trend. Thus, a sharp increase from one year to another in the difference between the total of known increments of assets and the total of known increments of liabilities--i.e., a sharp increase in the second difference between successive absolute amounts--may signal an unusual increase in the unknown liability item "notes outstanding".
An attempt of this kind was made by Ames for 1956 Ames for through 1960 calling the residual "apparent change in Soviet deposits and notes", for his known items did not include enterprise deposits. In three of the five years the residual was negative, i.e., the known increments in liabilities exceeded those in assets. Ames did not carry the attempt further, to our knowledge.
As was just noted, the method of balance-sheet increments has the major drawback of being incapable of yielding absolute estimates of the amount of notes out-standing, and, therefore, also of relative (percentage) changes in notes outstanding. It can only suggest absolute changes in notes outstanding, and relative changes of changes. But should these results suffice, then it does have some significant advantages over the balance-sheet reconstruction method.
First, as indicated, it need not be concerned with balance-sheet items which are large in themselves but change (absolutely) little from year to year and may not be available or easily estimatable. Second, it can utilize data available only as flows (as against stocks), which, however, can be taken as proxies for changes in certain stock categories (i.e., balance-sheet items);
for example, the budget surplus or deficit, which might be taken as a proxy for change in the treasury's account with the Bank ("Budget Account")--though, as will be assumed below, the proxy relationship may not be very dependable in the Soviet case. Such an attempt at obtaining an indication of changes in increments in currency in circulation for recent years was made by us (Grossman, 1983 ). 2. There is, however, a good deal of scattered information to the effect that the quality of foodstuffs sold in official outlets may have appreciably declined.
3. Some transactions between individuals are subject to price ntrol; e.g., dwelling-space rentals, used car purchases. In both cases the controls appear to be widely disregarded.
4. For automatic lending by the State Bank (in the form of the so-called payment credit [platezhnyi kredit)) in the event of a firm's lack of funds to pay suppliers, and that such loans in effect are of indefinite term
[bessrochnye] and are as often as not overdue, see Lisitsian:1984, p. 3 and n. 3 . For the tendency of State Bank branches to automatically furnish currency for wage payment so as not to hamper production, regardless of the governing regulations, see Bunich:1982, p. 9. There are also reports of bribery of bank officials by enterprises; see Radio Liberty: 1984, pp. 4-5. 5. The inventories series is probably less reliable than the loans series. 11,579 mil.r., thanks to raised procurement/purchase prices and increased subsidies from the budget. (Nar. khoz. 1983, pp. 273, 536.) 7.
In bank statistics, in contrast to inventory statistics, "construction"
refers not only to the construction industry proper--the contractor firms--but also to building and installation done for themselves by nonconstruction firms.
8.
Cf. Rol' banka ... (1980, pp. 140-142) . Inasmuch as bank loans to the construction industry replaced over time customers' advances to construction, the same customers were relieved of a financing role to a similar extent, and thus of a need to themselves borrow from the banking system.
While noting this much, we still treat bank loans to construction as distinct from such to other branches of the economy, which in yet another way contributes to a "conservative" test of our hypothesis.
